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EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON STATE HIGHWAY WORK
Samuel C. Hadden,
Chairman, State Highway Commission of Indiana
When the program for this Road School was prepared some
weeks ago, the topic assigned me was: “What It Takes to
Perfect a State Highway System”. Since the assignment of
that subject, our country has actively entered the second World
War, and this fact takes all thought of attaining perfection
entirely out of our minds. In a world as imperfect as that in
which we are now living, any discussion of perfection is out of
order. We might dwell on that subject just long enough,
however, to remark that two of the conditions that must be
present if we are ever to attain perfection of our State Highway
System are a long era of unbroken peace and a long era of
prosperity. Since such eras are neither present nor near at
hand, we may as well abandon the original subject entirely and
discuss one more in keeping with the present times and circum
stances. With this thought in mind, I have obtained the
permission of the Chairman of this Road School to change my
subject to read: “Effects of the War on State Highway Work”.
I am sure that is the subject uppermost in the minds of all
the members of the State Highway Organization, of all the
contractors and others who co-operate with the Highway
Department, and of the press and general public so far as
highway matters are concerned.
Of first importance now, as always, is the subject of finances.
It is well known that certain appropriations are made for other
purposes before any money accrues to the account of the State
Highway Department. Not only are the costs of collecting the
automobile license and gasoline taxes deducted from the yield
of these taxes, but the appropriation for the State Police, the
appropriation to the general fund, and the appropriations to the
cities and counties for street and road purposes, are prior
claims on the proceeds before any money goes to the State
Highway Department. In ordinary times, and especially in
good times, it is probably to the advantage of the State
Highway Department to have these other appropriations fixed
in amount so that large increases in revenues will directly
benefit the state department. But when the yield of these
taxes decreases, all shrinkage comes out of the money that
would ordinarily go to the State Highway Department. It is
recognized that, with tire rationing and the curtailment in the
production, sale, and use of motor vehicles, the yield of our
motor-vehicle-tax revenues may shrink substantially and even
greatly this year. Just how much this shrinkage will amount
to, no one can say at this time; one man's guess is as good as
another's. We do not know for sure that all the restraints
that can be imposed have as yet been imposed; there may be

TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL ROAD SCHOOL

21

others still to come. Even the effects of the present restraints
are not yet clearly evident, although there is a likelihood of a
substantial reduction in the State Highway revenues.
It may be, however, that the shrinkage for the year will be
less than now seems likely. While there are various influences
operating to reduce travel and revenues, there are certain
compensating influences operating in the other direction.
Moreover, it is impossible to tell just how long people will
voluntarily refrain from the use of their cars, if they will run;
and it is also impossible to tell how long people will be per
mitted to use their cars even if they want to and can obtain
tires, repairs, etc.
Despite all these uncertainties, it is clearly incumbent upon
us, and it is our firm intention, to carry on our customary
activities as nearly as possible in a normal manner, consistent
only with our great obligations in connection with the war
effort. It is our hope that the total amount of our construction

I ig. 1. Widening: with concrete along brick section of U. S. Highway 31 at
Whiteland preparatory to resurfacing.

this year will not shrink greatly as compared with recent years,
even though we are shifting the emphasis from roads carrying
only general traffic to those carrying a very large volume of
traffic created by wartime conditions and activities. Hoping,
and believing, that we may accept this as our guiding philoso
phy in the present year, we may now turn our attention to
some of the definite effects of the war upon several of the
major subdivisions of the State Highway Department. Let us
consider them one by one.
Roadside Improvement
Roadside improvement came into the highway picture: (1)
when the strictly engineering approach set up conditions for
which mechanical solutions were not the answer, and (2) when,
as the width of right-of-way increased from 60 to 70 feet to
the 100 or 200 feet required for the modern road, vegetative
cover had to be established on at least 70 per cent of that
right-of-way.
Alteration of landscape practices in gradients, the longer
warped slopes superseding the old 1 1/2:1 slopes all cut to the
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same plane, was one of the definite factors in holding main
tenance costs stable in spite of the rapidly increasing areas
within the right-of-way. Sodding, seeding, mulching, and soil
treatment processes are being improved constantly, and new
and more economical methods are being tried out each season.
When certain standards for shoulder widths were set up for
military highways, it was revealed that Indiana's minimum had
been meeting these standards for several years. This accom
plishment cannot be credited to any one group, but it is signifi
cant that this progress mentioned above, all of definite value
to a wartime road, has come about since the start of the
roadside-improvement demonstration program.
The recreational features, such as roadside parks and tables,
might seem to be a side issue, when considered in the presence

Fig. 2.
priorities.

Steel mesh reinforcing no longer used in construction because of war

of war. However, the value of recreation to morale is nowhere
disputed. The value of low-cost recreational facilities in every
section of the state becomes increasingly important as traffic
movement is curtailed, or becomes more hazardous because of
the condition of older cars and tires. There are many features
of our daily existence that should be curtailed before the
wholesome and economical outdoor picnic areas are sacrificed
on the theory that this might in some way improve our war
effort.
Traffic
The State Highway Commission has not been operating
under war conditions long enough to know exactly what effect
and influence the war will have on state highway traffic.
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We are of the opinion that the war will bring about a
complete change in the traffic pattern on Indiana highways,
and will affect greatly the kind, location, and volume of work
done on our roads. This change, which is already under way,
will bring great concentrations of defense workers on certain
routes, increased commercial-vehicle concentrations on others,
and probably will sharply reduce week-end pleasure and
recreational travel. That these trends are already under way
is evidenced by the facts that during December, 1941, on the
state highway system there was a reduction of over 500
accidents as compared to November, and that all of this
decrease was on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, with the other
four days of the week showing slight increases. From this one
month's experience, it appears that rationing of tires and
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discontinuance of new car production will be seen most heavily
in reduced pleasure travel. Attempts to conserve cars and
tires will result in more passengers per vehicle and lower
speeds. It is ironical that persons who wouldn't reduce speed
to save a life will do so to save a tire.
This change of emphasis from recreational and pleasure
travel to commercial and industrial traffic will reduce traffic
strains on some roads, and greatly increase them on others.
This necessitates a reclassification of roads and changes the
work required on them. At the same time, priorities on critical
materials make it increasingly difficult for us to obtain signs,
signals, and paint to mark these roads properly, and the further
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diversion of experienced traffic personnel into the armed forces
and into defense industries will place heavier burdens on those
who remain.
I do not want to burden you with statistics, but I do ask your
forbearance as I relate to you a few most interesting figures
concerning the traffic flow on our state highway system for the
years 1937, 1940, and 1941.
In 1937 the computed total vehicle miles on the entire system
was 3,219,948,000. In 1940 this figure jumped to 4,146,749,000,
an increase of 926,801,000 vehicle miles. The year 1941 showed
an increase over 1940 of 543,224,000 vehicle miles. In other
words, the increase in that one year over the previous year
was more than half the increase of 1940 over 1937. In 1937

Fig:. 4. Traffic confusion on State Road (J2 at Charlestown Powder Plant before
dual-lane construction and addition of pedestrian overhead structure.

the average number of vehicles per mile of road per year was
373,274; in 1940 it was 420,447; and in 1941 it had skyrocketed
to 475,525. In 1937 the average number of vehicles per mile
of road per day on the state highway system was 1,023; in 1940
this figure was 1,152; and in 1941 the number was 1,303.
Using 1937 as a standard of 100 per cent, we had traffic
increases in percentages as follows: 1937, 100 per cent; 1940,
112.6 per cent; and 1941, 127.4 per cent.
Even though this county has been at war for a very short
time, we have been operating under a National Defense
Program for over a year. Typical defense installations are the
Charlestown Powder Plant and the Kingsbury Ordnance Plant.
Let me give you a picture concerning the traffic on State Road
62, south of Charlestown where the world’s largest powder
plant is located.
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In 1937 the average number of vehicles per day was 525.
In 1941 this number leaped to 6,317, or 1150 per cent over 1937.
On State Road 62 just north of Jeffersonville, we have a similar
picture, also due to the location of the plant at Charlestown.
In 1937, State Road 62 at that location carried an average of
650 vehicles per day, while four years later, in 1941, this figure
jumped to 8,300 vehicles per day,—1177 per cent over 1937.
The Ordnance Plant at Kingsbury, in LaPorte County, is
responsible for the following comparative figures: In 1937,
on U. S. 20, east of Michigan City, the average traffic count
was 4,640; in 1941 it was 6,200, an increase of 34 per cent.
On State Road 35, north of U. S. 6, the average traffic count was
1,250, whereas in 1941 it was 6,500, an increase of 420 per cent.

Figr. 5. Scene at Charlestown Powder Plant after construction of dual-lane high
way on State Road 02 and addition of pedestrian overhead structure and traffic
control facilities.

Eventually 20,000 employees will be working at the Kingsbury
Plant, and a continued increase in the amount of traffic will be
experienced before it becomes static.
The National Defense Program created many individual
problems on the state highway system, but the effect of the
war will be to add to those problems that we are attempting to
solve now. It is anticipated that tire rationing will reduce
somewhat the miles driven by the average motorist for
pleasure, as will the curtailment in the production and sale of
passenger automobiles. During the past year, commercial
traffic has increased in volume of vehicles; and these com
mercial vehicles are now being loaded more heavily as a result
of national defense. The traffic flow of commercial vehicles
has increased, and it is reasonable to suppose that it will
continue to gain. Since war was declared, army convoys are
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becoming more numerous on our state highway system. All
these facts point to the conclusion that highway work during
the war will be concentrated in certain areas and on certain
specified routes of the state system.
At this early date, no one can foresee where this will lead
us during the war, but for 1942, unless there are further
restrictions placed on the use of motor vehicles and gasoline,
the following is indicated:
(a) Little reduction in total of vehicle-miles traveled—
commercial and pleasure vehicles.
(b) Regrouping of type and location of traffic to form an
entirely different pattern.
(c) Voluntary speed reduction and increased care in driving.
(d) Congestion around industrial areas and on city streets.
(e) Traffic confusion and delay during blackouts.
(f) Over-all reduction in accidents and fatalities.
(g) More attention to maintenance and regulation to reduce
traffic inefficiencies and continued emphasis on construc
tion.
(h) Probable strict routing of traffic to save time and reduce
congestion.
About 37 per cent of our highway system forms what might
be called our industrial network. It seems that we shall be
forced to concentrate most of our effort on this group of roads
and to attempt in every way possible to reduce delays, con
fusion, and accidents. This 37 per cent of our system in 1941
accounted for 72 per cent of our total accidents; so we shall not
be neglecting our accident problem by this selective application
of our traffic effort.
Engineers

Enlistments and the selective-service law have caused vacan
cies in our engineering department. Engineers who were
reserve officers in the Army have resigned to join the armed
forces—the Air Corps, the Engineer Corps, and the Artillery.
Other engineers have resigned to accept engineering positions
in industry, at salaries prohibitory for us to pay. Our budget
for personal service (salaries) is fixed by the General Assem
bly, and we are not in position to meet salaries offered to our
engineers who accept positions in industrial and defense plants.
Those who remain with us will work harder than ever before,
and we believe they will do so gladly.
Road and Bridge Construction

Our experience points to the conclusion that our future
program for road and bridge construction, throughout the
duration of the war, will be confined to those roads that are,
or will be, designated as Access Roads and those roads included
in what is known as the Strategic Network System.
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Access Roads. Access Roads are defined as those “roads
(including bridges, tubes and tunnels thereon) to military and
naval reservations, to defense industries and to defense indus
try sites, and to the sources of raw materials when such roads
are certified to the Federal Works Administrator as important
to the national defense by the Secretary of War or the Secre
tary of the Navy, and for replacing existing highway and
highway connections that are shut off from general public
use by necessary closures or restrictions at military or naval
reservations and defense-industry sites.” (Sec. 6, Defense
Highway Act of 1941.)
These projects are initiated within either the War or the
Navy Department through the district engineer under whose
jurisdiction the reservation or defense plant lies. The pro
cedure requires the approval of the Secretary of War or the
Secretary of the Navy, then of the Federal Works Administra
tor, who turns over the proceedings to the Commissioner of
the Public Roads Administration. The Commissioner, through
his District Engineer who is in charge of the Federal High
ways in the district in which the project is located, authorizes
the Highway Commission of the State in which the project lies
to proceed with plans, specifications, bids, and construction.
The Congress has authorized, in the Defense Highway Act of
1941, the appropriation of $150,000,000 for expenditure on
such Access Roads.
Indiana will be affected in such territory as that surrounding
the various reservations and defense-industry sites, such as
Charlestown, Burns City, Kingsbury, Indianapolis, Newport,
and Columbus. Payments for the construction of such Access
Roads will be made largely or entirely from the federal appro
priation.
Strategic Highway Network. There has been prepared for
each state, by the Federal Works Administrator, and approved
by the Secretary of War, a diagrammatic map showing thereon
roads that are combined to form what is designated as the
Strategic Highway Network.
The Congress has authorized the appropriation of $25,000,000
to be apportioned among the several states, under the formula
used in the Federal Highway Act for normal federal aid to
state highway departments, for expenditures to carry outprojects to correct critical deficiencies in lines of the strategic
network of highways and bridges, during the continuance of
the emergency declared by the President on May 27, 1941,
Indiana's share is approximately $600,000.
Roads in Indiana designated on the strategic network in
clude: U.S. 40 across the state; U.S. 31 from the Ohio River
to the Michigan state line; U.S. 20 across the state; U.S. 50
traversing the state; U.S. 67 from Indianapolis to Anderson;
S.R.9 from Anderson to Huntington; U.S. 24 from Huntington
to the Ohio state line; U.S. 52 from the Ohio line to U.S. 41
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in Benton County, north of Fowler; and U.S. 41 from its junc
tion with U.S. 52 to the Illinois state line; U.S. 36 from
Indianapolis to the Illinois line; and S.R. 15 from Bristol to
the Michigan line.
The Defense Highway Act of 1941 authorized expenditures
for construction of roads and bridges on the strategic network
on the basis of 75% of the cost being defrayed by federal funds
and 25% by state highway funds. This Act also increased
federal participation in construction under provisions of the
existing Federal Highway Act, up to 75% of the total cost,
provided the construction is performed on the strategic net
work.
Projects on the Strategic Network originate with, and are
initiated by, the State Highway Commission in the same man
ner as is provided in the Federal Highway Act.
Even if the money is available for our proposed program,
we still have a high hurdle to take. Before we can proceed
with construction we must have priority ratings on each
project, if materials included on the critical list are used.
This really means that, if these critical materials are used,
our projects must be confined to Access Roads or to the
Strategic Network. We have no assurance that even all such
projects will receive priority ratings. If State projects are to
be constructed, the critical materials will have to be eliminated.
From these statements, one can readily discern that there will
be many interferences with our normal procedure; but all
these will be cheerfully endured and taken in our stride.
Rigid pavements and reinforced structures must be re
designed in order to eliminate, as far as possible and still
adhere to good engineering practice, all critical materials,
especially steel. This means plain concrete pavements, the
elimination of expansion joints, and the use of contraction
joints spaced twenty feet apart, to replace our former re
inforced concrete pavement design in which we used steel
mesh reinforcement, contraction joints at forty-foot intervals
with load-transfer bars, and expansion joints one hundred and
twenty feet apart, including load-transfer bars.
In our new design of concrete pavement, only 2.20 tons of
steel are required per mile; these are the 5/8 bars for tie bars
at the longitudinal joints only. We have been constrained to
eliminate reinforced structures, if the span is twenty feet or
less, by substituting unreinforced arches, batteries of pipe of
vitrified clay or concrete.
It is difficult to substitute other types for structures of over
twenty-foot span without reinforcing steel. We may have to
adopt the expedient of using untreated timber structures for
such spans over twenty feet for the duration of the war, and
following the emergency construct permanent structures using
steel or reinforced concrete. Of course, such an expedient
would not be used for spanning the Wabash or White Rivers.
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We will be able to continue our road-widening and resur
facing projects, since steel and other materials at present on
the critical list are not required. Much of the work we are
most anxious to do falls into these untroubled categories, for
which we are devoutly thankful.
Maintenance

Obviously, at all times and under all circumstances, we
must maintain our highways and protect our immense invest
ment in our wonderful highway system. This is our first and
our greatest responsibility.
The maintenance fund of the State Highway Department is
limited to a specific sum, set by appropriation by the legisla
ture. It is inelastic. We are losing experienced mechanics,
machinery operators, laborers, and capable office help to
defense industries because we cannot raise the pay of these
men as much as we would like to do and stay within our
budget. This problem has affected every district, and some
subdistricts, especially those in the vicinity of the various
defense plants.
Traffic concentrations around defense plants have been
highly detrimental to roads of the intermediate type and have
also caused serious failures of other road surfaces and bases,
and even of rigid pavements, which have been adequate and
ample to withstand the normal traffic they were designed to
carry.
The lack of available new equipment has increased the neces
sity of overhauling and repairing old equipment, with the
attendant difficulties encountered in obtaining repair parts.
There is a definite shortage of machinery repair parts and
this fact, combined with delayed deliveries, even under priority
ratings, has affected the efficiency of our normal maintenance
work.
Operating as we do on a fixed budget, the quantities of
materials we purchase must of necessity be reduced, because
of the increased cost of these materials. Labor costs have
increased to the extent that the number of mechanics, opera
tors, and laborers has been reduced.
Just what our own tire problem will be is not yet definitely
known. Tire rationing has become a stern reality. True it is
that tires for vehicles engaged exclusively and solely in the
transportation of road maintenance materials—and this means
trucks—come within one of the seven eligible groups for new
tire purchases. However, unless there is a revision of the
regulations governing this rationing, there will not be enough
tires to fill the requirements of these eligible groups. It looks
as if we will have to go slow on passenger-car tires in more
ways than one.
We will be forced to retread or recap as needed the tires we
now have. It is a huge problem, and we will have to meet it
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as we go and try to solve it with as little confusion and dis
location of our work as is possible. It will require perseverance
and will test our fortitude and challenge our ingenuity.
We have reviewed briefly some of the effects of the war on
our procedure and our program. Our organization will rise to
every occasion and meet every responsibility.
PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR PERIOD
Walter H. Blucher,
Executive Director, American Society of Planning Officials,
Chicago, Illinois
Sixty days ago while we in the United States of North
America were giving half-hearted attention to the defense of
our country, many of us were thinking of the post-defense
period—of what we were going to do if somebody else won
the war for us.
Today, when most of us are giving almost whole-hearted
attention to the winning of the war, talk of the post-war
period doesn't seem very realistic. I say “almost whole-hearted
support" because I believe that most of us as yet have no
realization of the size of the task before us, the effort re
quired, or the sacrifices necessary to win the war.
Our first task is to win the war. To that end we must direct
all our energies. If we are to plan for a post-war United States
of America, we must be sure that we, not somebody else, are
in a position to make and carry out those plans.
I think we can and will win this war. It may take a little
longer than it would if all of us took it more seriously, but when
the showdown comes we will get together and forget all indi
vidual profit motives.
And so we don't want to win the war only to lose the things
we fought for.
It isn't wholly unrealistic to think now of the post-war
period, to think of the things we are fighting to preserve. And
although we might want to relegate post-war planning into a
little corner in the back of our heads, realism tells us that
we cannot separate war planning from after-we-have-won-thewar planning. They merge together, and I hope to demonstrate
shortly why they are inseparable.
There are at least three aspects of post-war planning. First,
there must be some planning for the peace that is to follow
the termination of the war. I doubt very much if we are in
any position to say what the terms of that peace shall be. If
the war ended tomorrow, we wouldn't know what to do with
Messrs. Hitler, Himmler, and Hirohito. We don't have to
bother about Mussolini. We wouldn't know whether they ought
to be shot, interned, or turned over to the Poles for a just

